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COMMENTS

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT: LIMITING THE USE
OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
INTRODUCTION

The constitutionality of prosecutorial use of peremptory
challenges to exclude blacks from juries, solely because of their
race, has been the subject of frequent litigation.' Although prosecutors may deny any misconduct, there can be little doubt that
they have exercised their peremptory challenges on racial
grounds in cases involving black defendants and white victims. 2
Black defendants have often asserted that the exclusion of
blacks from juries denied them due process and the equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution.3 The Supreme Court, in the
landmark case of Swain v. Alabama,4 precluded such constitu1. See Annot., 19 A.LR.3d 13, 27-32 (1977). While this comment will focus on cases involving black defendants and white victims, charges of
prosecutorial misconduct have arisen in other instances. See, e.g., Doepel v.
United States, 434 A.2d 449 (D.C. 1981) (all whites peremptorily struck resulting in white defendant's conviction by an all-black jury); People v. Kagan, 101 Misc. 2d 274, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (all Jewish
prospective jurors peremptorily struck).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975) (evidence established that, in 15 criminal cases in 1974, prosecutors peremptorily challenged 81% of available blacks); Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161
(D.C. Cir.) (government peremptorily struck all 19 blacks), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 853 (1948); People v. Allen, 23 Cal. 3d 286, 590 P.2d 30, 152 Cal. Rptr. 454
(1979) (state struck all 14 blacks); People v. Teague, 108 111. App. 3d 891, 439
N.E.2d 1066 (1982) (state used all ten of its peremptories to exclude blacks);
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (prosecutor peremptorily struck 92% of available blacks and only 34% of available whites), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d
739 (1981) (although the record was unclear, the prosecutor struck at least
10 blacks and an all-white jury was sworn).
3. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (all 6 blacks struck);
United States v. Greene, 626 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1980) (all 5 blacks struck);
Davis v. United States, 374 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967) (3 blacks struck); People v.
Harris, 17 Ila. 2d 446, 161 N.E.2d 809 (1959) (all blacks struck), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 928 (1960). The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part
that "[no state shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 16:349

tional attacks when it held that race was an acceptable criterion
for exercising peremptory challenges in a particular case.5 The
Court stated that a black defendant could establish a violation of
the fourteenth amendment only by showing that the prosecution systematically used its peremptory challenges over a period
of time to exclude blacks.6
The task of proving systematic exclusion proved to be virtually impossible, and courts in three states avoided the Swain
rule by holding that their state constitutions afforded black defendants greater protection than that provided by the federal
constitution.7 In the recent case of People v. Payne,8 however,
an Illinois appellate court adopted a new approach. Instead of
relying on the Illinois Constitution, the Payne court held that
prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks
from juries solely because of their race violates the black defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury drawn
from a representative cross-section of the community.9 This decision marks the first time that a court has applied the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution to limit the racial
use of peremptory challenges.' 0
5. Id. at 223.
6. Id. at 227.
7. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 881 (1979); People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739
(1981).
8. 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982).
9. Id. at 1037, 436 N.E.2d at 1048. The sixth amendment provides: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The representative cross-section requirement was subsequently incorporated into
the sixth amendment by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975). See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
10. A California appellate court previously held that the sixth amendment prohibited the peremptory exclusion of Spanish-speaking jurors.
People v. Lucero, 99 Cal. App. 3d 17, 160 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1979) (opinion deleted
from official reporter by order of the California Supreme Court dated January 24, 1980). In Lucero, the trial court had informed the prospective jurors
that witnesses would testify who spoke only Spanish and that an interpreter would be sworn to translate the testimony into English. The prosecutor argued that jurors fluent in Spanish might apply their own
interpretation to the testimony instead of relying solely on the interpreter's
translation. As a result, the prosecutor, over the defendant's objections, peremptorily struck all Spanish-speaking prospective jurors. The Lucero
court held that the prosecutor's action violated the defendant's right to a
jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community as guaranteed by both the sixth amendment and the California Constitution. 99 Cal.
App. 3d at -, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
The validity of the Lucero court's utilization of the sixth amendment is
subject to question. Prior to Lucero, the California Supreme Court, in People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978), held that
the California Constitution precluded prosecutors from excluding members
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PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS

In order to understand the role of the peremptory challenge
in the jury selection process, it is necessary to briefly outline the
general procedure used in selecting juries." A designated official initiates the process by compiling a pool of all persons eligible for jury service. 12 Names from the pool are placed in a jury
wheel and are then drawn from the wheel to fill the venire. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that racial discrimination at any level of this selection process violates a defend3
ant's equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment.1
Historically, however, protection against discrimination was not
of a "cognizable group" solely on the basis of their group membership. Id.
at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. See infra notes 47-52 and
accompanying text. The Wheeler holding was expressly based on the Cali-

fornia Constitution; the court stated that all claims involving the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges were to be governed by the California
Constitution. 22 Cal. 3d at 287, 583 P.2d at 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910. Thus, it
would appear that the Lucero court erred in applying the sixth amendment.
This conclusion is underscored by the fact that the California Supreme
Court, while never overruling Lucero, ordered the opinion deleted from the
official reporter.
11. For a full discussion of the jury selection process, see J. VAN DYKE,
JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES (1977); Daughtrey, Cross Sectionalism In
Jury-Selection Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REV. 1
(1975).
12. The selection of the jury pool is generally accomplished either
through the random method or the key-man method. The random method,
employed by most states, generally uses voter registration lists as the
source of names for the jury pool. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 1 (1981)
(voter lists or driver's license lists). In the federal system, jury selection is
governed by the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968. 28 U.S.C. §§ 18611869 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Under the Act, juries must be selected randomly from a fair cross-section of the community. Id. at § 1861. Names of
prospective jurors must be chosen either from voter registration lists or
from lists of actual voters. Other sources, however, may be used in order to
ensure that the pool reflects a cross-section of the community. Id. at § 1863
(b) (2). Although the use of voter lists discriminates against individuals
who do not register to vote, Congress concluded that the practice was not
unfair "because anyone with minimal qualifications-qualifications that are
relevant to jury service---can cause his name to be placed on the lists simply
by registering or voting." H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1794-95. For a discussion of
jury selection in federal courts, see Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving A Democratic Institution, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 247 (1973).
Under the key-man method, the jury commissioner or other designated
official chooses "key men" in the community to solicit names of prospective
jurors. E.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. arts. 408, 409 (West Supp. 1983);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 234, § 4 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
13. See, e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). See generally Kuhn, Jury Discrimination:
The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1968).
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extended to the final stage of the jury selection process, the voir
dire .14

During voir dire, each prospective juror is questioned regarding his or her ability to render an impartial verdict. Because the composition of a jury may affect its verdict, 15 voir dire
16 It
is considered an important step in the selection process.
gives to the prosecution and the defense the opportunity to challenge prospective jurors "who may be biased about the defendant, the prosecution, or the case, and who thus might threaten
7
the jury's impartiality."'
Prospective jurors may be challenged either for cause or peremptorily. Challenges for cause, although unlimited in
number, are subject to the court's control and permit the rejec8
tion of jurors only upon a legally provable basis of partiality.'
The peremptory challenge, on the other hand, is the right to reject jurors without a reason.' 9 The value of the peremptory challenge is that a prospective juror, not subject to a challenge for
cause, can be struck on the belief that he or she possesses some
14. The apparent reason for not extending protection to the voir dire
stage was the belief that if the venire was selected in a constitutional manner, the jury actually chosen must necessarily comply with the constitutional requirements. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 17 Ill. 2d 446, 161 N.E.2d 809
(1959) (defendant failed to show that blacks were excluded from the venire), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 928 (1960); State v. King, 219 Kan. 508, 548 P.2d
803 (1976) (defendant did not show purposeful discrimination in the selection process).
15. See Ashby, Juror Selection and the Sixth Amendment Right to an
Impartial Jury, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1137, 1138-39 (1978); Comment, Peremptory Challenge-DiviningRod for a Sympathetic Jury?, 21 CATH. LAW.
56 (1975) (characteristics which influence juror selection). See generally H.
KALVEN & H. ZIESEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (1965).
16. See Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power",27 STAN.
L. REV. 545 (1975).

17. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 139.
18. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). Court rules or statutes
usually define the grounds for challenges for cause. For example, a prospective juror who is related to the defendant, victim, or attorneys is subject
to removal for cause, as is one who has previously served as a juror in the
same type of case. MINN. R. CRIM. PRO. 26.02 subd. 5 (West 1979); N.Y. CRIM.
Poc.
LAw § 270.20 (McKinney 1982); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.42 (Anderson 1981). In many states, a person is not disqualified even if he has
formed an opinion about the case if he states under oath that he believes he
can render an impartial verdict based on the evidence presented. E.g., ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 14 (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-1-5 (Burns Supp. 1982);
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 35.16 (Vernon Supp. 1982-83).
19. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). The number of peremptories varies depending on the jurisdiction and offense charged. In Illinois, if
there is a single defendant, both the state and the defendant are afforded 20
challenges in cases punishable by death, 10 in cases punishable by imprisonment, and 5 in all other cases. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4(e) (1981). Cf.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 20(c) (1) (1979).
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latent bias or prejudice. 20 In this regard, courts and commentators have recognized the peremptory challenge as one of the
most important factors in securing an impartial trial. 2 1
While peremptories can serve an important function in selecting an impartial jury, the potential for abuse is immense because the challenges generally are not subject to the court's
control. 22 If exercised in a discriminatory manner, peremptory
challenges can change what would have been a heterogeneous
jury into a homogeneous one. 23 Indeed, the peremptory chal-

lenge has been referred to as "probably the single most significant means by which.., prejudice and bias is injected into the
'24
jury selection process.
SWAIN V. ALABAMA:

THE SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION TEST

In 1965, the issue of prosecutorial abuse reached the
Supreme Court. In Swain v. Alabama,25 a young black was convicted and sentenced to death for the rape of a 17-year-old white
woman. The defendant contended that he was denied equal
protection of the law when the prosecutor peremptorily challenged all six blacks on the venire. The Court noted that "[t] he
essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without be20. The important function that the peremptory challenge plays in eliminating persons suspected of possessing some latent bias or prejudice is underscored by the fact that, during voir dire, some jurors will deceive the
court either because they are ashamed to admit their beliefs or because
they underestimate the impact of those beliefs on their ability to render an
impartial verdict. Babcock, supra note 16, at 554. Moreover, " 'the more
prejudiced or bigoted the jurors, the less can they be expected to confess
forthrightly and candidly their state of mind in open court.'" Id. at n.32
(quoting A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY 103 (1973)).
21. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965); Pointer v. United
States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887) ("experience has shown that one of the most effective means to free the jury
box from men unfit to be there is the exercise of the peremptory challenge"); Babcock, supra note 16, at 552-55; Note, Voir Dire: Establishing
Minimum Standardsto Facilitatethe Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1493, 1493 (1975).
22. For this reason, it has been suggested that prosecutors should be
denied the use of the challenge. Brown, McGuire & Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional
Use or Abuse, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 192, 234 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
TraditionalUse or Abuse ]. Other authors have suggested that the number
of peremptories should be limited to five or less. Ashby, supra note 15, at
1166; Kuhn, supra note 13, at 222.
23. See VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 222; Traditional Use or Abuse,
supra note 22, at 287.
24. Imlay, supra note 12, at 270.
25. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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ing subject to the court's control." 26 Reasoning that a radical
change in the operation of the challenge would result if a prosecutor's motives were subject to scrutiny, the Court concluded
that a prosecutor must be presumed to be exercising the state's
challenges to obtain an impartial jury.27 The Court rejected the
defendant's claim and held that the equal protection rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment were not violated by the
striking of Negroes in a particular case. 28 The Court stated that
"[t] he presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor therefore subjected to examination by allegations that in the case at
hand all Negroes were removed from the jury or that they were
removed because they were Negroes. '29 The Court indicated in
dicta, however, that the presumption could be overcome and a
prima facie case of discrimination established if it could be
shown that the prosecutor systematically excluded blacks in
case after case, regardless of the circumstances, the crime, or
the victim.

30

The Swain decision has been widely criticized 3' because,
unless a pattern of discrimination is established, a defendant
cannot challenge the state's use of its peremptories. 3 2 While
later defendants can point to earlier cases as establishing a pattern of prosecutorial discrimination, the constitutional rights of
the first few defendants are left unprotected.3 3 Observing this
26. Id. at 220.
27. Id. at 221-22. The Court's refusal to permit judicial inquiry into a
prosecutor's motives for striking particular jurors was based on the Court's

belief that the challenge would no longer be peremptory if a prosecutor's
judgment were "subject to scrutiny for reasonableness and sincerity." Id. at
222. Such reasoning, however, is no longer tenable in view of the Court's
subsequent interpretation of the sixth amendment. See infra text accompanying note 46.
28. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
29. Id. at 222 (emphasis added).

30. Id. at 223-24. Because the Court concluded that the record was insufficient to establish systematic exclusion, the Court found it unnecessary
to decide the issue. Id. at 224-25. See infra note 41.

31. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 285, 583 P.2d 748, 767, 148
Cal. Rptr. 890, 908 (1978) (Swain affords no protection to the first defendant
to suffer discrimination); Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289, 294, 336 A.2d
290, 295 (1975) (Nix, J., dissenting) (Swain perpetuates discrimination); Imlay, supra note 12, at 270 (Swain allows prejudice to be injected into the
jury); Kuhn, supra note 13, at 302 (Swain imposes an insurmountable burden); Traditional Use or Abuse, supra note 22, at 193 (Swain "presents an

...unworkable standard of review and fails to remedy the most pervasive
forms of prosecutorial misuse of the challenge").
32. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965).
33. See, e.g., Blackwell v. State, 248 Ga. 138, 281 S.E.2d 599 (1981) (state
struck 10 blacks to obtain all-white jury; defendant did not show systematic
exclusion); People v. Teague, 108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 439 N.E.2d 1066 (1982)

(state used all 10 of its peremptories to exclude blacks; no systematic exclusion); State v. Edwards, 406 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1981) (state used 8 of its 10
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anomaly, Justice Nix stated: "Is justice only obtainable after repeated injustices are demonstrated? Is there any justification
within the traditions of Anglo-Saxon legal philosophy that permits the use of a presumption to hide the existence of an obvious fact?" 34 As is illustrated by two cases from the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, courts have been extremely reluctant to find the requisite unconstitutional pattern of
prosecutorial discrimination. In United States v. Carter,35 the
government had peremptorily challenged all five prospective
black jurors, and the defendant was subsequently convicted by
an all-white jury. The defendant sought to show that the government systematically excluded blacks from juries. His evidence
established that, in 15 cases, prosecutors in the Western District
of Missouri had peremptorily struck 57 of the 70 blacks available
for jury service, and in 7 of the cases, all available blacks were
excused. 36 While the court acknowledged that the defendant
had raised a serious question, it concluded that the defendant
had failed to meet the systematic exclusion test set out in
Swain .37
In United States v. Nelson, 38 the government peremptorily
challenged all three blacks on the venire. Relying on the statistics used in Carter,the defendant again alleged that prosecutors
in the Western District of Missouri systematically excluded
blacks. The court rejected the defendant's claim, but noted that
the case presented another example in which the prosecutor exercised his peremptories to obtain an all-white jury.3 9 Of little
consolation to the defendant was the court's belief that if such
practices continued the district judges would take appropriate
action. 4° The logical question presented by these decisions is
left unanswered; how many defendants must raise the issue of
discrimination before systematic exclusion is established?
These cases illustrate the difficulty of proving systematic
exclusion. To meet the test, a defendant must show not only
that the prosecutor consistently used his peremptories to discriminate, he must also show "when, how often and under what
circumstances the prosecutor alone" has been responsible for
peremptories to exclude blacks; no systematic exclusion) cert. denied sub
nom., Edwards v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2011 (1982).
34. Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289, 294, 336 A.2d 290, 295 (1975)
(Nix, J., dissenting).
35. 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976).

36. Id. at 848.
37. Id. at 850. The court, however, gave no indication as to the amount
of evidence necessary to establish systematic exclusion.
38. 529 F.2d 40 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976).

39. Id. at 43.
40. Id.
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striking the available blacks. 4 1 Additionally, Swain has been interpreted as holding that a defendant must establish that the
prosecutor excluded every available black juror in every case involving a black defendant.4 2 The fact that only one defendant
has been able to prove that the prosecutor systematically excluded blacks 43 demonstrates the difficulty of the defendant's
burden of proof under the systematic exclusion test.
CIRCUMVENTING THE SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION TEST

Recognizing that Swain provided black defendants with
only illusory protection against discrimination, a number of
courts side-stepped the Supreme Court's systematic exclusion
test." These courts relied on Taylor v. Louisiana,45 in which
the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right to an
impartial jury necessarily requires a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.46 The California
41. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 224 (1965) (emphasis added). In
Swain, this requirement was fatal to the defendant's claim. While the evidence showed that Negroes had never served on juries in Talladega County,
the defendant failed to show in which cases the prosecution alone was responsible for striking all of the Negroes. Id. at 224-25. The Court reasoned
that the selection of jury pools and venires is completely within the control
of state officials; the total exclusion of blacks, therefore, would give rise to a
primafacie case of discrimination on the part of the state. In the peremptory system, on the other hand, both the prosecution and defense participate in the rejection of jurors. Thus, an inference of state discrimination
cannot arise unless the prosecution is shown to have participated in the
exclusion of blacks. Id. at 226-27. It is virtually impossible, however, to establish how many blacks a prosecutor excluded because records of peremptory challenges are rarely kept. See Kuhn, supra note 13, at 302.
42. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 535 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)

(defendant did not show that state excluded "all" Negroes) (emphasis ad-

ded); Ridley v. State, 475 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (defendant
failed to show "any effort to exclude all Negroes") (emphasis added).
43. State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979). In Brown, the defendant
was convicted by an all-white jury after the prosecutor peremptorily challenged all five blacks on the venire. The defendant's evidence established
that the prosecutor had, on numerous occasions, exercised a disproportionately large number of challenges against blacks. Id. at 752. In addition, the

court noted that in one case the prosecutor admitted that he had excluded a
greater number of blacks because of their tendency to vote not guilty. Id. at
752 n.1. In view of the evidence, the court concluded that the defendant had
sustained the burden of proving systematic exclusion. Id. at 754.
44. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1978); People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881
(1979); People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981).
45. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
46. Id. at 528-30. In Taylor, the Court reversed the male petitioner's kidnapping conviction on the ground that the Louisiana jury selection statute
excluded women from participating as jurors. Under the statute, women
were not selected for jury service unless they fied a written declaration of
their desire to participate as jurors. The Court held that the exclusion of
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Supreme Court, in People v. Wheeler,47 became the first court to
subject the state's use of its peremptories to judicial review
without requiring proof of a pattern of discrimination. The
Wheeler court incorporated the representative cross-section requirement into the California Constitution and concluded that
the state constitution provided greater protection against discrimination than that afforded by Swain.4 On this basis, the
court reversed the murder convictions of two Negroes and held
that the state's peremptory exclusion of blacks deprived the defendants of their right, under the California Constitution, to a
jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the
49
community.
Although the Wheeler court adhered to the proposition that
the state must be presumed to have exercised its peremptory
challenges in a constitutionally permissible manner,5 0 the court
reduced the burden of proof necessary to rebut that presumption. Under Wheeler, a defendant must make as complete a
showing as possible of the circumstances surrounding the utilization of peremptories, establish that the excluded persons
were members of a "cognizable group," and show a "strong likelihood" that such persons were excluded because they were
women from jury venires deprived the defendant of his sixth amendment
right to an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the
community. Id. at 535-37. The Court noted that while the statute did not
affirmatively disqualify women, its effect was that women were rarely present on venires. Id. at 525. In discussing the importance of participation by
all segments of the community in the criminal justice system, the Court
stated:
Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable
segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with
"[T] he broad representathe constitutional concept of jury trial ....
tive character of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance of a
diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the administration
of justice is a phase of civic responsibility."
Id. at 530-32 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
It is important to note that the issue in Taylor was the exclusion of
women from venires; the Court, however, was concerned primarily with the
practical effects which resulted from the absence of women on juries. Id. at
530-32. The Court observed that juries were not only less representative of
the community, but they also failed to reflect the "distinct quality" which
women bring to the jury room. Id. at 531-32.
47. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
48. Id. at 285, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09.
49., Id. at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. See also People
v. Allen, 23 Cal. 3d 286, 590 P.2d 30, 152 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1979) (prosecutor peremptorily struck all 14 blacks); People v. Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d 296, 583 P.2d
774, 148 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978) (prosecutor admitted he intentionally excluded
blacks).
50. 22 Cal. 3d at 278, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
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members of the group. 51 If the trial court determines that a
primafacie case of discrimination exists, the burden shifts to
the prosecutor, and he must satisfy the court that his challenges
were not exercised solely because of the individuals' member52
ship in the excluded group.
The test adopted by the California Supreme Court has
found surprisingly little support. While the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts 53 and two New York courts5 4 have also
made the Taylor cross-section requirement, as enunciated by
Wheeler, an integral part of their state constitutions, the overwhelming majority of courts still apply Swain's systematic exclusion test.55 Accordingly, People v. Payne,56 which based its
holding on the federal Constitution, may have a greater impact
51. Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The court enumerated
several factors to consider in determining whether the prosecutor is practicing racial discrimination. See infra note 97.
52. 22 Cal. 3d at 282, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. If the prosecutor fails to show that his challenges were exercised in a constitutionally
permissible manner, the trial court must dismiss those jurors already selected and begin a new selection process from a different venire. Id. at 282,
583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
53. See Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (racial
discrimination contravenes art. 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
54. People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981) (court held
that New York Constitution prohibited exclusion on basis of race); People
v. Kagen, 101 Misc. 2d 247, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (exclusion of
Jewish jurors).
55. See, e.g., Blackwell v. State, 248 Ga. 138, 281 S.E.2d 599 (1981) (state
exercised 10 of its 11 peremptory challenges against blacks to obtain an allwhite jury); People v. Teague, 108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 439 N.E.2d 1066 (1982)
(state exercised all 10 peremptories against blacks); State v. Stewart, 225
Kan. 410, 591 P.2d 166 (1979) (state's peremptory challenges of 8 blacks resulted in all-white jury); State v. Edwards, 406 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1981) (8 of
state's 10 peremptories were used to exclude all blacks); State v. Gatlin, 295
N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 1980) (2 blacks peremptorily struck); Gaines v. State, 404
So. 2d 557 (Miss. 1981) (state struck only black on the venire); State v. Johnson, 616 S.W.2d 846 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (state struck remaining 4 blacks
after 1 was removed for cause); State v. Shelton, 281 S.E.2d 684 (N.C. Ct.

App. 1981) (8 of state's 11 peremptory challenges exercised against blacks
to produce an all-white jury); Wheeler v. State, 539 S.W.2d 812 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1976) (state challenged the only 2 blacks on venire); State v. Grady, 93
Wis. 2d 1, 286 N.W.2d 607 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (state struck 3 blacks). But
see State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (court
followed Swain, but indicated a willingness to follow Wheeler when the
proper case arose).
56. 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982). In Payne, the prosecutor
exercised eight peremptory challenges; six of the seven available black jurors were struck. Although one black was seated, the court observed that
this occurred only after defense counsel had objected to each challehge on
the ground that the state was excluding blacks solely because of their race.
Id. at 1045,436 N.E.2d at 1054. On appeal, the state argued that the excluded
blacks had the distinguishing characteristic of being unmarried. The state
admitted, however, that this fact was only discovered after it searched the
appellate court record. Id. The state's argument was further weakened by
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in limiting prosecutorial discrimination. 57
Like Wheeler, the Payne court relied on Taylor v. Louisiana.58 Although Taylor was concerned with the selection of the
venire and not with the use of peremptory challenges during
voir dire,59 the Payne court reasoned that the discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges could emasculate the constitutional right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section
of the community.60 Concluding that it would be irrational to
hold that a state may do at voir dire what it is constitutionally
prohibited from doing during the venire selection, the court
stated that a defendant "is constitutionally entitled to a petit
jury that is near an approximation of the ideal cross section of
the community as the process of random draw and constitution'61
ally acceptable procedures permit."
The court was careful to point out that a black defendant is
not constitutionally entitled to have blacks included on the jury
or to a jury which proportionately represents every group in the
community. 62 This rule is necessitated by the fact that Illinois
employs a random jury selection method and, therefore, there
will invariably be instances when blacks do not appear on
venires.6 Once blacks are present on venires, however, Payne
precludes the prosecution from "affirmatively" excluding them
64
through the use of peremptories solely because of their race.
The court held that, when it "reasonably appears" to the trial
court that the prosecutor exercised his challenges on purely racial grounds, the court should require the prosecutor to prove
that blacks were not excluded simply because of their race.6 5
the fact that the state allowed two unmarried nonblack jurors to be seated.
Id.
57. But see Gaines v. State, 404 So. 2d 557 (Miss. 1981) (court rejected

sixth amendment argument and applied Swain test); State v. Davis, 529
S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (evidence established that, in 31 cases, state
struck 75% of the blacks; court reluctantly found no sixth amendment violation); see also infra note 105 and text accompanying notes 106-10.
58. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). See supra text accompanying note 46.
59. See supra note 46.
60. 106 IlM. App. 3d at 1037, 426 N.E.2d at 1048.
61. Id. Accord People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal.

Rptr. 890 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 449,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435
N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981).
62. 106 Mll. App. 3d at 1037, 436 N.E.2d at 1048.
63. See supra note 12.
64. 106 IM.App. 3d at 1037, 436 N.E.2d at 1048.
65. Id. at 1040, 436 N.E.2d at 1050. As in Wheeler, if the prosecutor fails

to demonstrate that his peremptories were properly exercised, the trial
court must dismiss those jurors already seated and begin a new selection
process from a different venire. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1040, 436 N.E.2d at 1050-51.
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The Sixth Amendment: A Valid Basisfor Preventing Racial
DiscriminationThrough the Use of Peremptories?
The validity of using the sixth amendment to limit
prosecutorial discrimination must be examined in light of the
objectives of the cross-section requirement mandated by Taylor.66 Unquestionably, the primary goal is to ensure that a defendant receives an impartial jury.67 To achieve this end, juries
must reflect the broad perspectives of the community. Indeed,
the Supreme Court, in Peters v. Kiff, 68 stressed the importance
of participation by all segments of the community:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room
qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the
range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as
a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives
unsusthe jury of a perspective on human events that may have
69
pected importance in any case that may be presented.
Implicit in the cross-section requirement, therefore, is the recognition that each juror brings his or her own experiences and
views into the jury room.70 If jurors are selected from venires
which represent a cross-section of the community, these diverse
experiences and views will interact with each other so that individual biases are eliminated or lessened, thereby enhancing
jury impartiality. 7 1 The critical point is that the interaction only
occurs between those individuals who actually sit as jurors. If
courts allow prosecutors to peremptorily exclude blacks solely
because of their race, juries will not reflect the distinctive values
and attitudes of the black community. In such cases, the broad
66. See supra text accompanying note 46. At the outset, it is important
to note that Swain can be distinguished on two grounds. First, the Swain
Court addressed the question of whether the peremptory exclusion of
blacks denied a defendant the right to the equal protection of the law under
thefourteenth amendment. Secondly, Swain was decided in 1965; it was not
until 1968 that the Supreme Court made the sixth amendment binding on
the states. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
67. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-32 (1975). The Taylor Court
cited with approval Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). "[T] he broad representative character of the
jury should be maintained, ...

as assurance of a diffused impartiality

...."419 U.S. at 530.
68. 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (white defendant has standing to challenge state
system which excludes blacks from grand and petit juries).
69. Id. at 503-04.
70. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531-32 (1975) (women
bring a "distinct quality" into the jury room); VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at

160.
71. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-32 (1975); People v.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276, 583 P.2d 748, 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 902 (1978);
VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 24.
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representation of views which is essential to jury impartiality
will be destroyed, and the cross-section requirement will be rendered meaningless. 7 2 As one author aptly noted: "If a jury [venire] is truly representative, why single out some people for
73
their biases and once again unbalance the jury?"
While the black defendant suffers the greatest injustice, injury also extends to the black community as a whole. The
Supreme Court, in Strauderv. West Virginia,74 noted that a system which denies blacks the opportunity to participate as jurors
in the administration of the law "is practically a brand upon
them,.. . an assertion of their inferiority and a stimulant to that
race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to
all others. 75s Whether the exclusion occurs during the selection
of the jury pool as in Strauder, or during voir dire through the
use of peremptory challenges, the effect is to label all members
of the black community as unfit for jury service.
The exclusion of blacks also endangers the second objective
of the cross-section requirement-ensuring respect for the integrity of the judicial process. 76 Juries are democratic institutions which foster public involvement in the administration of
the law.77 Courts and commentators have repeatedly recog72. People v. Payne, 106 Ill.
App. 3d 1034, 1037, 436 N.E.2d 1046, 1048
(1982). This is not to say that a black defendant may challenge the composition .of the jury whenever blacks are not represented, for the Supreme

Court has often stated that a defendant cannot dispute the makeup of the
jury simply because no members of his race are present. E.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203 (1965); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284 (1947). It is
necessary, however, to examine the reason underlying the absence of
blacks. If the result is due to the failure of blacks to appear on the venire,
the defendant clearly has no grounds to challenge the composition of the
jury. The representative cross-section rule does not require venires to represent every segment of the community. All that is demanded is that
'venires... must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof." Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). If, on the other hand, the absence of
blacks is due to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, an altogether different situation arises. In this instance, the prosecutor affirmatively excludes an identifiable segment of the community, not on the basis
of individual beliefs, but because of beliefs adhered to by the group as a
whole. In so doing, the prosecutor destroys the broad representation of
views which the cross-section requirement was designed to protect and
thereby deprives the defendant of his right to a jury drawn from a crosssection of the community.
73. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 160.
74. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
75. Id. at 308.
76. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); People v. Gilliard,
No. 81-913, slip op. at 13 (Ill. App. Feb. 16, 1983); People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App.
3d 1034, 1038-39, 436 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (1982).
77. See Imlay, supra note 12, at 259-62; Kuhn, supra note 13, at 246-47.
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nized that community involvement promotes public confidence
in the fairness of the judicial process. 78 The jury system plays
an important role in this regard because the jury is a conduit
'79
through which the community expresses its "sense of justice.
This "sense of justice" is not accurately reflected if an identifiable segment of the community is affirmatively discriminated
against and is denied the opportunity to participate as jurors. In
such cases, not only is the legitimacy of the verdict subject to
question, 80 but the entire judicial process is tainted because the
courts are perceived as condoning the discrimination. 81
When viewed in the context of the objectives of the representative cross-section rule, the sixth amendment provides a legitimate means of curbing racial discrimination. The Swain
Court's systematic exclusion test, by requiring proof of a pattern
of discrimination, clearly affords black defendants inadequate
protection. Courts must recognize that racial discrimination,
whether it occurs in a single trial or over a period of time, imperils the right to an impartial jury.
Subjecting a prosecutor's motives to judicial review obviously alters the nature and operation of the peremptory challenge.82 In as much as the Swain Court expressly sought to
avoid such a result, 83 courts may be reluctant to use the sixth
amendment in future cases.8 4 Courts, however, must not become engrossed with concern over the impact of judicial review
on the peremptory system. Since the peremptory challenge is
78. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Kuhn, supra
note 13, at 246.
79. [Tjhe jury is designed not only to understand the case, but also to
reflect the community's sense of justice in deciding it. As long as there
are significant departures from the cross sectional goal biased juries are
the result-biased in the sense that they reflect a slanted view of the
community they are supposed to represent.
H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1797.
80. VAN DYKE, supra note 11, at 42; Kuhn, supra note 13, at 246. Justice
Jackson, dissenting in Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950), stated: "A trial
jury on which one of the defendant's race has no chance to sit may not have
...the appearance of impartiality, especially when the accused is a Negro
and the alleged victim is not." Id. at 302 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
81. See People v. Payne, 106 IlM. App. 3d 1034, 1038-39, 436 N.E.2d 1046,
1049 (1982).
82. Compare text accompanying note 26 with text accompanying note
65.
83. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
84. Indeed, in recent cases, courts refused to subject the challenge to
judicial control because they feared that the nature of the peremptory system would be radically changed. See, e.g., People v. Teague, 108 111. App. 3d
891, 897, 439 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (1982) (rejecting the Payne rationale); State v.
Grady, 93 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 286 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Ct. App. 1979) (peremptory challenges would not be peremptory if subject to judicial review).
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not constitutionally required,8 5 the sole issue is the black defendant's right to an impartial jury. Because the discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges impairs that right, the system
86
must be changed.
Establishing ProsecutorialDiscrimination:
Overcoming the State's Presumption
Although courts must have the ability to eradicate abuses of
the peremptory system, a difficult question arises with respect
to when a court should subject a prosecutor's motives to judicial
scrutiny. While Wheeler and Payne both presumed that the
state properly exercised its peremptories, 7 the courts adopted
dissimilar views concerning who can raise the issue of
prosecutorial discrimination and the burden of proof necessary
to rebut the presumption. Under Wheeler, the defendant must
raise the issue and establish a primafacie case of discrimination.88 Only then does the burden shift to the state to establish
that its peremptories were exercised for reasons other than
race. 89 Payne, on the other hand, permits either the defendant
or the trial court to raise the issue once it "reasonably appears"
that blacks were excluded solely on racial grounds.9 0 At that
point, the presumption is rebutted, and the prosecutor must
demonstrate that the exercise of the challenges was not
discriminatory. 9 1
Payne significantly reduces the strength of the presumption, and, in turn, the defendant's burden of proving discrimination. Unlike Wheeler, which requires evidence of a "strong
likelihood" of discrimination, 92 Payne permits a defendant to
challenge the state's use of peremptories whenever it "reasonably appears" that the state is discriminating. Moreover, if the
trial court determines of its own volition that the state is improperly utilizing its challenges, the defendant need not present
85. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
86. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (when a constitutional claim is opposed by a nonconstitutional one, the
former must prevail); People v. Payne, 106 Ill.
App. 3d 1034, 1039, 436 N.E.2d
1046, 1050 (1982) (a constitutional right must control over a procedural
device).
87. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 278, 583 P.2d 748, 762, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 904 (1978); People v. Payne, 106 IlM. App. 3d 1034, 1040, 436 N.E.2d 1046,
1050 (1982) (by implication).
88. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. See supra text
accompanying note 51.
89. Id. at 281, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
90. 106 Ill.
App. 3d at 1040, 436 N.E.2d at 1050.
91. Id.
92. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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any evidence to rebut the presumption because the burden will
have already shifted to the state to establish that it was acting in
93
accordance with the Constitution.
Viewed pragmatically, the Payne rationale is well-founded.
Courts must have the authority to raise the issue of discrimination so that they may protect the integrity of the judicial process.94 They cannot permit, nor be perceived to permit, racial
discrimination in the courtroom. Although trial judges must not
assume the role of defense counsel, courts have an obligation to
enforce the Constitution. It would be a dereliction of that obligation if they failed to challenge prosecutorial action which they
reasonably believe violates the Constitution. While prosecutors,
as officers of the court, should be presumed to have acted in accordance with the Constitution, 95 that presumption must not obscure reality. Judges must recognize that any attorney, given
the choice between a neutral juror and one biased in his favor,
will invariably strike the former.96 For this reason, courts
should accord prosecutors only a minimal presumption.
It is impossible to formulate a mechanical test to determine
when a prosecutor is practicing racial discrimination. Since the
determination must ultimately be based on the common sense
and sound discretion of the trial judge, Payne's "reasonably appears" test provides the most practicable approach. Undoubtedly, if a prosecutor excludes all or a large number of blacks, the
court should view his actions with suspicion. Nonetheless, numbers alone should never be conclusive. Consideration must also
93. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
95. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 278, 583 P.2d 748, 762, 148
Cal. Rptr. 890, 904 (1978).
96. An oft-cited example of this fact is a book prepared by the Dallas
County District Attorney's Office which listed several factors that a prosecutor should consider in selecting jurors:
Il. What to look for in a juror.
A. Attitudes
1. You are not looking for a fair juror, but rather a strong,
biased and sometimes hypocritical individual who believes
that Defendants are different from them in kind rather than in
degree.
2. You are not looking for any member of a minority group
which may subject him to oppression-they almost always
empathize with the accused.
VAN DYKE,supra note 11, at 152-53 (quoting 65 The Texas Observer 9 (May

11, 1973)). Similarly, one commentator noted that if a prosecutor believes
that blacks will sympathize with a black defendant, it must reasonably follow that whites would sympathize with the white victim. In such cases, a
prosecutor, by peremptorily challenging blacks, "does not eliminate
prejudice in exchange for neutrality; he secures a friendly juror in place of a
hostile one." The state "is, in fact... taking advantage of racial divisions to
the detriment of the defendant." Kuhn, supra note 13, at 290-91.
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be given to the number of whites excluded, the intensity of the
voir dire examination, and the demeanor
of the prospective ju97
ror in response to that examination.
While the primary aim is to protect the right to an impartial
jury, it is important to note that courts can, by exercising restraint, also preserve the value 98 of the peremptory challenge.
If, after considering all the factors, the court can discern any rational basis which would support the prosecutor's challenge, the
court should uphold it. Conversely, if the court reasonably suspects that blacks were excluded solely because they were black,
it must require the prosecutor to demonstrate otherwise. In this
situation, the court should again exercise restraint and sustain
the challenge if the prosecutor's evidence raises any reasonable
question regarding the prospective juror's impartiality.
Admittedly, the reasonableness test is somewhat vague.
That fact, however, is not a valid ground for preventing courts
from taking any action to curb prosecutorial impropriety. On
the contrary, a mechanical test for determining when a prosecutor is practicing racial discrimination would be impracticable,
since each case must be decided on the basis of the peculiar
facts and circumstances giving rise to the claim. In this respect,
the reasonableness test provides a flexible method of eliminating prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory system.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN ILLINOIS:
THE AYrERMATH OF PAYNE

The Payne decision marked the first time that an Illinois
court restricted the state's use of its peremptories. 99 Previously,
the Illinois appellate courts had steadfastly refused to inquire
into the reasonableness of a prosecutor's challenges. 10 0 In both
97. In Wheeler, the California Supreme Court articulated a number of
factors which are relevant in determining whether a prosecutor is practicing racial discrimination. For example, a defendant may show: (1) that the
prosecutor struck all or a disproportionate number of black jurors; (2) that
the only distinguishing characteristic was their race; and (3) that the prose-

cutor failed to conduct a meaningful voir dire examination. People v.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 280-81, 583 P.2d 748, 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 905 (1978).
98. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
99. The same court that decided Payne subsequently reaffirmed its position. People v. Gilliard, No. 81-913 (Ill. App. Feb. 16, 1983); People v. Gosberry, 109 Ill. App. 3d 674, 440 N.E.2d 954 (1982).
100. See, e.g., People v. Mines, 103 Ill. App. 3d 673, 431 N.E.2d 1126 (1981)
(followed Swain); People v. Lavinder, 102 Ill. App. 3d 662, 430 N.E.2d 243

(1981) (Swain affords adequate protection); People v. Allen, 96 Ill. App. 3d
871, 422 N.E.2d 100 (1981) (followed Swain); People v. Fleming, 91 1l1. App.
3d 99, 413 N.E.2d 1330 (1980) (defendant failed to prove systematic exclu-

sion); People v. Attaway, 41 Ill. App. 3d 837, 354 N.E.2d 448 (1976) (defendant
did not show purposeful discrimination); People v. Thornhill, 31 IlM. App. 3d
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People v. Fleming 01 and People v. Allen, 10 2 the courts declined
10 3
to adopt the position taken by the California Supreme Court
in Wheeler. 10 4 Both courts criticized the Wheeler test as "vague
and uncertain" and reasoned that the peremptory challenge
would no longer be peremptory if a prosecutor's motives were
subject to judicial scrutiny. 10 5 Unfortunately, this preoccupation with the impact of judicial review on the peremptory system has continued and has resulted in disagreement among the
appellate districts. 106 In People v. Teague, 07 the court rejected
the Payne rationale despite the fact that the state exercised all
ten of its peremptories against blacks. The court noted that adherence to Payne would essentially destroy the function of the
peremptory challenge. 10 8 Likewise, in People v. Newsome,109 the
court refused to adopt Payne and instead followed Swain's systematic exclusion test. i" 0 The court observed that the peremp779, 333 N.E.2d 8 (1975) (court has no authority to restrict state's peremptories).
101. 91 IM.App. 3d 99, 413 N.E.2d 1330 (1980).
102. 96 Ill. App. 3d 871, 422 N.E.2d 100 (1981).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
104. In a number of cases, the court found it unnecessary to decide
whether to adopt the Wheeler test because the defendant failed to preserve
a record of the voir dire proceedings. See, e.g., People v. Belton, 105 Ill. App.
3d 10, 433 N.E.2d 1119 (1982) (record did not show that excluded prospective
jurors were black); People v. Vaughn, 100 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 427 N.E.2d 840
(1981)

(court will not speculate as to prosecutor's motives); People v.

Bracey, 93 Ill. App. 3d 864, 417 N.E.2d 1029 (1981) (defendant must preserve
a complete record of voir dire; discrimination cannot be proved by numbers
alone).
105. People v. Allen, 96 Ill. App. 3d 871, 878, 422 N.E.2d 100, 105-06 (1981);
People v. Fleming, 91 IU.App. 3d 99, 105, 413 N.E.2d 1330, 1334 (1980). Both
courts also rejected the argument-subsequently accepted by the Payne
court-that the state's exclusion of blacks violates the defendant's sixth
amendment right to an impartial jury. Their reasoning, however, was superficiaL In Fleming, the court merely concluded that it was not necessary
to limit the use of peremptory challenges in order to insure jury impartiality. 91 Ill. App. 3d at 106, 413 N.E.2d at 1335. In Allen, the court cited Fleming and simply stated: "We .. . reject defendant's contention that the
State's exercise of its peremptory challenges violated defendant's right to
an impartial jury guaranteed by the sixth amendment ...

"

96 Ill. App. 3d

at 878, 422 N.E.2d at 106.
106. Illinois has five appellate districts. The first district, which is located
in Cook County, is comprised of five divisions. Considerable disagreement
can arise among the different districts and divisions over the same issue
because a decision by one court has no binding effect on another division or
district. Garcia v. Hynes &Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill. App. 3d 479, 481,
331 N.E.2d 634, 636 (1975). The disagreement which can arise is illustrated
by the recent case of People v. Teague, 108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 439 N.E.2d 1066
(1982), in which the court repudiated the Payne holding. See infra text accompanying notes 107-08.
107. 108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 439 N.E.2d 1066 (1982).
108. Id. at 897, 439 N.E.2d at 1070.
109. 110 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 443 N.E.2d 634 (1982).
110. Id. at 1050, 443 N.E.2d at 638.
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tory system would be significantly altered if the challenge were
subject to judicial control."' Interestingly, the Teague and Newsome opinions lacked the in depth reasoning exhibited in
Payne. Neither court considered the objectives of the cross-section requirement. Instead, by focusing attention on the impact
of judicial review on the peremptory system, the courts clearly
elevated a procedural device over the constitutional rights of the
defendant. Moreover, the decisions seriously undermine judicial integrity. It must be remembered "that the appearance of
2
justice in a criminal trial is as important as justice in fact.""
Yet, under Teague and Newsome, the inescapable result is that
Illinois prosecutors, no matter how blatant their conduct, can
practice racial discrimination in the courtroom so long as their
conduct does not constitute an impermissible pattern of systematic exclusion under Swain.
This absurdity is largely attributable to the position of the
Illinois Supreme Court. In 1959 the court stated:
The right of the peremptory challenge is a substantial one which
should not be abridged or denied. It may, by its very nature, be
exercised or not exercised according to the judgment, will or caprice of the party entitled
thereto, and he is not required to assign
3
any reason therefore."
In subsequent decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court adhered to
this principle. In People v. Butler," 4 the court applied Swain's
systematic exclusion test and held that a prosecutor's use of
peremptories was not subject to constitutional attack." 5 Similarly, in People v. King," 6 the most recent supreme court case to
deal with the issue of prosecutorial discrimination," 7 the court
111. Id. at 1055-56, 443 N.E.2d at 642.
112. People v. Gilliard, No. 81-913, slip op. at 13 (111. App. Feb. 16, 1983).

113. People v. Harris, 17 Ill. 2d 446, 451, 161 N.E.2d 809, 811-12 (1959), cert.

denied, 362 U.S. 928 (1960).
114. 46 Ill.
2d 162, 263 N.E.2d 89 (1970).
115. Id. at 165, 263 N.E.2d at 91. See also People v. Powell, 53 Ill. 2d 465,

478, 292 N.E.2d 409, 417 (1973) (fact that 5 blacks were struck was insufficient
to establish primafacie case of purposeful discrimination).
116. 54 Ill.
2d 291, 296 N.E.2d 731 (1973).
117. The issue came before the court in 1981 in People v. Gaines, 88 Ill.
2d
342, 430 N.E.2d 1046 (1981), wherein the defendant argued that the court
should reject Swain and overturn its earlier holdings. The court found it

unnecessary to decide the issue because the defendant did not object until
all the jurors were sworn. In addition, the court observed that the defendant failed to preserve a record of the voir dire. Id. at 358-59, 430 N.E.2d at
1054.
After this article went to press, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Davis, No. 54276 (1ll. Feb. 18, 1983) (Simon, J., dissenting). Although
the record in Davis lacked any evidence of prosecutorial discrimination,
and the court, therefore, could have disposed of the issue on this ground
alone, the court instead chose to reject the defendant's claim on the basis
that he failed to establish systematic exclusion as required by Swain. Id. at
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reaffirmed the Swain test. 118
A number of appellate courts have cited these cases as authority for the proposition that a court may not subject a prosecutor's motives to scrutiny. 119 Indeed, in Newsome, the court
stated that because of the Illinois Supreme Court's holdings, it
lacked the authority to adopt a contrary position. 120 Such reliance is misplaced. As noted in Payne, the Illinois Supreme
Court cases were decided before the Taylor Court made the representative cross-section standard an integral part of the sixth
amendment. On this basis, the Payne court correctly concluded
12 1
that the Illinois Supreme Court decisions were inapplicable.
Since the Illinois Supreme Court has granted the state leave to
appeal the Payne decision, 122 the disagreement which exists between the appellate courts will soon be resolved. It is hoped
that the court will recognize that the peremptory system is being abused 23 and that the sixth amendment, as applied by
Payne, provides a valid means to eliminate those abuses.
5-6. In terms of the Payne holding, it is significant that the majority did not
mention either Payne or the sixth amendment. Rather, the court stated
that "Io] nly a systematic and purposeful exclusion of blacks from the jury,
'in case after case,' raises a question under the fourteenth amendment." Id.
at 5. Thus, it would appear that Payne is still good law. However, later in
the opinion the court stated that peremptory challenges "'are totally subjective and not subject to scrutiny or examination.'" Id. at 6 (quoting Commonwealth v. Henderson, 497 Pa. 23, 29-30, 438 A.2d 951, 954 (1981)). This
language, combined with the fact that the court has continued to cite Swain
with approval indicates that the supreme court may overrule Payne. All
that can be said at present is that Davis will likely do little to end the disagreement which currently exists between the appellate courts.
118. 54 Ill. 2d at 298, 296 N.E.2d at 735. See also People v. Powell, 53 M11.
2d
465, 292 N.E.2d 409 (1973) (fact that five blacks were struck was insufficient
to establish primafacie case of purposeful discrimination).
119. See, e.g., People v. Newsome, 110 II. App. 3d 1043, 1052, 443 N.E.2d
634, 639 (1982); People v. Mims, 103 Ill. App. 3d 673, 677, 431 N.E.2d 1126, 1129
(1981); People v. Lavinder, 102 Ill. App. 3d 662, 667, 430 N.E.2d 243, 246 (1981);
People v. Allen, 96 Ill. App. 3d 871, 876, 422 N.E.2d 100, 104 (1981).
120. 110 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1052, 443 N.E.2d 634, 639 (1982).
121. People v. Payne, 106 IM.App. 3d 1034, 1043-44, 436 N.E.2d 1046, 1053
(1982).
122. People v. Payne, 1982 Ill. Adv. Sh. 24, Dec. 15, 1982, - N.E.2d -.
123. See, e.g., People v. Gilliard, No. 81-913 (M11.
App. Feb. 16, 1983) (noting
that "it is an open secret that prosecutors in Chicago and elsewhere" exclude blacks in cases involving black defendants); People v. Gosberry, 109
Ill. App. 3d 674, 440 N.E.2d 954 (1982) (state exercised seven peremptories,
all against blacks; comparison of backgrounds of persons who became jurors with backgrounds of those challenged revealed that only distinguishing
characteristic of those excluded was race); People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d
1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982) (state contended excluded blacks were distinguishable because they were unmarried, yet state permitted unmarried
nonblack jurors to be seated).
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CONCLUSION

Courts must act to control the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. If jury venires are constitutionally selected
to represent the diverse perspectives of the community, there is
no valid reason why the courts should permit prosecutors to arbitrarily destroy that diversity through the use of peremptory
challenges. The potential injury to the black defendant, the
black community, and the judicial system as a whole clearly justifies subjecting the challenge to some form of judicial scrutiny.
Courts must recognize that racial discrimination has no place in
our judicial system. In this regard, it is worth noting the words
of Justice Murphy in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. 124:
Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury
service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact
lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open
the door to class distinctions and discriminations
125 which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.
Robert Mork

124. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
125. Id. at 220.

